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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes economic behavior and theeffects of training and
income support policies in the lowwage labor market for women.The
opportunity set takes account of nonlinearities and discortinuities
associated with career interruption, part—timework, and government
programs. There are two sectors, one which rewards training andindividual
ability, the other which does not and oers only the minimumwage.
Effects of policies are found tovary importantly among heterogeneous
groups of women according to ability and taste for children andhousehold
work. Some preliminary empirical evidence ispresented to narrow the
choice of specification.
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Lubbock, Texas 79409I.Introduction
This paper analyzes economic behavior in the lowwaqe labor market for
women, and derives leplications for tralninp endtransferpolicies. On the
demand side, the opportunity set is based on a two sectormodel which
Incorporates the effects of trainino, career interruption andpart—time
work on the path of wage offers overthelife cycle. On the supply side,
women with different abilities and preferences for children and hometime
sort themselves among available opportunities. The incentiveeffects of
policies suchastraining, transfer and workfare programs are derived.
implications of the very different effects of policieson women with
dffprent abilities and tastes, and the implications of thefindings for
the design of policy evaluations are discussed. Preliminaryempirical
evidence is presented to narrow the choice between alternative
specifications of the model.
A number of economic relationships have been identifiedby previous
investigators as importantly influencing the life cycle pattern of labor
market and household outcomes. Women with differentability levels and
different preferences far children and home time (market work) willbe
criakinodecisionsat different margins Surt1ess and Hausman,
1978; Heckman, 1974 a and b; Heckman and Willis, 1977; andMoffitt, 1984).
One strand in the relevant literature has focusedon the linkage between
the wage offer and career interruption (Polachek, l975 Mincerand
Polachek, 1974; Weiss and Gronau, 1981; Sandeli and Shapiro, 1978 and 1980;
Corcoran, 1979; Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Corcoran and Duncan, 1983). Another
aspect of the budget equation which has received attention is the the
nonlinear and discontinuous relation of the wage offer to hours ofwork
Roser. 197, a relationship that among other thingsmay reflect areduction in intensity per hour of market work once women have childrenand
increased household responsibilities (Becker. 1985). Special attentionhas
also been given to the labor supply—fertility relation, especaliy in
reconciling findings from reduced form and structural specificationsof
life cycle models (Rosensweig and Wolpin, 1980; Lehrer and Nerlove, 1981;
Carliner, Robinson and Tomes, 1984.
The model developed in the present paper incorporates those features
from previous studies which are relevant to an. analysis of policyin the
lOW wage labor market for women.In addition, the opportunity set is
expanded to include two separate sectors (as in Dickens and Lang,1985?.
The features ofthemarket generate interactions among training
opportunities, ability and the minimum wage, and suggest the importanceof
takingproper account of heterogeneity.
To be more specific about the opportunity set, the model of demand and
supply for low wage women specifies two types of full—time jobs.Those in
the primary sector offer wages which reflect individual specific
differences in productivity. The wage offers in the primary sector also
reflect the costs and benefits of general training and any shared casts and
benefits of specific training. Jobs in the secondary sector pay all who
hold them at or close to the minimum wage and thus do not reward ability or
training to any significant degree. Still further complications are
assumedto arise forthose subject to an effective minimum wage, which for
someinterferes with on—the—job training, resulting in opportunity sets
that differ amoria women of different abilities not only in degree but in
kind.Jobsinthe secondary sector are assumed tobeavailable toallwho
want them. Thus the model abstracts from the problem of unemployment.
However, there is limited access to primary sector jobs, and training
subsidies are assumed to beeffective in increasing access for workers ofmarqinal ability. Part—time obopportunjtj are also considered, and the
issue of whether or rotwaaes in such obeare related to abilityisseen
to play an Important rolein the nature of the model whichemerqes.
number of insqhts into the effectsof labor market policiesemerpe
fromthe analysis. Once thereIatjonship of ability and preferencesto
the choice of thedosi rantsegment of the budgetconstraintis determjned
itbecomespossible to analyze how and why a qivenpolicy change will
affectwomen in accordance with their abilitiesand preferences. The model
suqget for example, th possibilitythat for women with a certainrange
of abilities and preferences,training programs and policies willwork
exactly as intended, with trainingleading these women to return to full—
time work earlier than they otherwise
would have, and at an increase in
earnings. For others, however,training programs which were perceived by
the women as workingmay create an income effect which induces themto
prolong the period out of the labor force.Other women who4 in the absence
of an effective training
program, would work when they had children, mioht
instead be induced to drop out ofthe labor force or reduce hours ofwork
when they had children. Moreover,some of those training programs, if
conditioned on parenthood, couldeven encourage some women to have
children, The model also makes clearwhy it is important to begin policy
analysis for the low wage market forwomen with a behavioral model that is
specified in detail. Consider, for
example, the persistent finding of
evaluation studies of labor markettraining programs that women receive
much higher returns thanmen, and that much of these additional retLtrnsare
associated with increased time at work(E.g., see Bloom and McLaughlin,
1982, pp. 2O—23 and Bassi etal, 1984,pp. 83—84.Consistentwith the
expectations of careful students oftrainingprograms,themodel readilyindicates that for some but not other groups of women,there is
considerable danger of confounding movements along a wage—hoursor wage
participation locus with shifts in the locus.This analysis explores how
these effects will vary among those with differentability and preference
combinations and if fully implemented empirically,would allow separation
of true from apparent effects.
In addition to the theoretical discussion, some suggestiveempirical
results are presented. The frequency and explanationsfor alternative life
cyclepatterns,e.g.. involving no career interruption, careerinterruption
with no part—time work, or with part—time work areconsidered and related
to measures of ability and mx ante measuresof preference for homework and
children. The empirical findings help to answercertain questions
pertaining to the role of opportunities for part—timework.
The organization of the paper is as follows.The next section
discusses the specification of the opportunityset and the utility function
for a model of female labor supply and fertilitydecisions. The following
section characterizes the solution to the basic model.Section IV
considers how individuals in such a model wouldreact to training
subsidies to changes in the guarantee or benefitreduction rate of a
transfer program and to workfare under the assumptionof rationing of low
wage jobs. Implications for currentevaluations of training policies are
also noted. The following section discusses various possibleextensions to
the model. Section VI presents the empiricalresults.4 final section
contains further observations about the model and abraef conclusion.
II.Elements of the Basic Model
Themodeldivides theI potential working years of a woman into three
periods, of durations I, T ard T years,respectively. The second
4period is considered to Includethe yearswhenany children that the woman
eighthave would be athome.The + iretperiod corresponds totheyears
before any childbearnq, and the last periodencompasses the years after
the children have left. During each of theseperiods, the wocan must
choose the level of her labor force participation andadditionally in the
second period she must choose whether or not to have children.These
decisions are influenced by her earnings possibilities ineach of the




Table 1 details the value of net productivity from full—timework. 4
trained primary sector worker has a productivity denotedby s which
reflects the individual ability and motivation. A primary sector worker
with no previous training must undergo training forI years, during
which time her productivity is only the fraction1 —rof her post—
training productivity.If the worker has been trained previously in a
primary sector iob, she still must undergo the training forTt years, but
her productivity is instead the fraction1 —Yrof her post—training
productivity. In this expression, Yrepresents the fraction of training
that is specific and must be repeated after aninterruption of primary
sector work. Thus in this model it is not depreciation andrestoration of
human capital that accounts for reductions in thewage offer after
interruption, but only loss of specific human capital.
Previously trained primary sector workers may also work part—time ata
wage which depends on their ability and motivation. Denote this part—time
wage by w (s) .Variousassumptions may be made about the nature of the
relationship between w anda. At one extremes it may be assumed that p
Cw () is a constant function whose value is independent ofs.This would
p
correspond to a situation where part—time work is available only in jobs
(perhaps in the secondary sector) where ability is not of real importance.
At the other extreme, it may be assumed that w (s) =. Inthis case a
p
trained primary sector worker may cut back her hours without incurring any
waqe penalty. As will be shown shortly, the general nature of the model is
somewhat sensitive to the particular assumptions which are made concerning
the relationship between part—time wafles and ability.
For the secondary sector all individuals have the same value
of productivitv w_, a value that is at or slightly above the minimum wage,
and any woman who wants work in the secondary sector can qet this wage if
she works full—time. Waes for part—time work in the secondary sector
are given by w which may be taken to be equal to w5 or may be taken
to be somewhat lower.
Not every woman will have enough ability to earn as much in the
primary sector as she can in the secondary sector. Furthermore, even among
those who could earn more in the primary sector, not all of them will be
able to work there because the minimum wage may interfere with the training
required for employment in that sector.At first glance, it might appear
that firm; would not be willing to train any woman whose productivity s(l
—r)during her training period fails below the minimum wage w5 since
if they did so they would have to be paying her a wage above her
productivity during the training period. However, firms may be willing to
engage in an implicit contract to finance some of the traininq costs and
recoup the costs by paying wages below productivity for a period after the
training period.To see this note that the total productivity of a
previously untrained woman over a time period Tlonoer than the traininq
III
periodis given 0T .I —r) + '.T—I) t a t
The first term represents the productivityduring training and the second
th productivity in the post-trainingperiod. The employer knowsthatin
order to retain the individual once she has beentrained, he must pay her
at least as much in the post trainingperiod as he could earn by going to
another firm. The amount that an individualcould earn at another firm
after having been trained at the First firm, isgiven by
I (1—Yr)+(I —2T t m t
Note in this expression that the first termincludes only specific and not
general training costs, since general training will havealready been
provided by the first employer. The difference betweenthese two
expressions, the value of productivity while intraining for the current
employer plus the difference between productivity atthe current firm once
training is completed and net productivityelsewhere is the maximum amount
that an employer would be willing topay to a woman in training. Dividing
the result by Tt qives the followingexpression as the wage rate that the
employer is willing to pay:4
I:Cl—7(1—
This,then, is the quantity which is required to exceed theminimum wage
for an employer to be willing to offera woman training in the primary
sector. Let be the value of 'iwhichjust equates this expression to
the minimum wage. thus represents minimum ability level required for
training in the primary sector in the absence ofany government
5
programs.
7As a final consideration regarding earnings opportunities.the model
assumes that there are fixed costs C per time periodif the woman engages
in either part—time or full—time work. This reflects the costsof getting
to and from work and additionally for women with children, thecosts of
arranqing for child care. C thus represents the coststhat are incurred
reqardless of the lenqth of the period that is worked. Highfixed costs
are expected to make part—time work less attractiverelative to full—time




lJti 1 ity Function
The utility function summarizing preferences may be expressed as
U[y h(t), c 3), where y is total lifetime income,h<t) is the time
path of home time in the second period,cis a binary variable with a
value of unity if the woman has children in the second period,and 8
an individual effect indicating relative preferencesfor children and
tirne.O individuals with a high value of 8 place a hiqh value both
having children and on home time spent with them,with the opposite
true for individuals with a
To provide a basis for
function is separable in income:
J ÷T,
U= u(y)+ c (t) v[ht) 8] dt
The function u, which describes the utility of income, is takento be
suchthatthe elasticity of marginal utility of income is qreater than zero
1
butdoes not exceed one.The function v describes how the utility of a
woman who has children and home time h(t) compares to utilitywhen there
are no children. For sirnplicity of exposition, it isassumed that the






a tractable model, we suppose that thisutilitychildren at home. Therefore, all women in the modeiwill work jrthefirst
and third periods, with the only question in thoseperiods beinq the chojc
0+sectors,arid women without children will work U11 tlme in theS000fid
period. The function which isassumedto be monotonicallv deciininq,
milews the value of home time to decline throuqhout thesecond period as
any children become older.
The junction v is lilustrated in Fiure 1.In this fiqure, 1,
1
,and 1 refer to the amounts of home time associated with full—time p a
market work, part—time market work, and no market work atall,
respectively. For convenience, the actual arument of v is theamount of
workinq time, defined as h. =1—1..The reference Utility level for
-
1 n i
eachwoman ispointA, representinq utility with no children and working
full—time. A woman with a hlqh desire for children willobtain a areater
Utility witr, children than without even if she has to work full—time,as
indicated by the fact that point B lies abovepoint A. This same
individual would obtain more utility if she could be homepart—time with
her children. as at point C.andeven more utility if she could be home
full—time, as at point D. A woman with a moderate desire forchildren, in
contrast, might find it preferable not to have children if shewere to work
full—time, as indicated by the fact that point E lies belowpoint A, but
would prefer to have children if she were to work onlypart—time or not at
all, and thus enjoy utility from children and home time as indicated either
by point F or point B. Finally, a woman who has little desire atall for
children might be characterized by HIJ, wherein utilityactually rises when
she is workinq and is away from children (but note that theutility of this
individual never is as hiqh with children as can be obtained without
children)The function v is characterized by the relatiars
(dadS) [v(h '3) —'h '3i]
p +
(dadS) [v(h ; 8—v(h '3)] >
p
These relations suqgest that the qreater the desire for children, the more
valuable additional home time will be.
III. The Base Solution to the Model
The base solution to the model relates the work and fertility
decisions of an individual to her ability, as reflected in the parameter
s,and her preferences as reflected in the parameter 8. More
specifically, the woman must decide in the second period whether tohave
children and if so, what parts of the period she wishes to work full—time,
part—time. or not at all.It will be assumed that ,whichis monotonic,
is larqe enough relative to the difference between the real waqe and real
interest rate to insure bunchina of work at the beqinninq of the second
B
period.
In this circumstance, the work decisions durinq the second period can
be characterized by two numberst ,theamount of time that passes in
p
thesecond period before the return to the labor force, and t, the
t
amount of time before the return to full—time work.Ift t ,then
p f
there is no part—time work; otherwise t. —trepresents the amount of
t p
time spent in part—time work. The decisions regarding botht and
and also the decision recarding chiliren, are functions of and 8.
Perhaps theeasiestwa.v to characterize the solution is to lookat the
choices made by women withdifferent combinations of ano '3at some
articularmoment in time, as lIustratedinFiqure 2 Trie two panels in
thisfiqurecorrespond tothe two e<treme assumptions reqardi no part—time
1wages whichwere mentioned before. Panel(a)represents the situation
where w is a constant independent ofs,and Danel(b)represents the
situationwhere w i =carid w5 w sothat part—time waqes are p Ps -
equalto full—time wages.Thereare corresponding figures for every moment
in time during the second period, and it iscf interest to investigate how
thesefigures change as the women move through thesecond period. First,
though,let us discusshow thedifferent areas in Figure 2 can be derived
fromthe model.
Suppose that Figure 2 corresponds to an instant of timet after the
second period has begun. In the left—handpanel, the curve JL represents
combinationsof and 8forwhich, atthespecified moment in time the
womenwill have chosen to have children and will bejust on the borderline
between being out of the labor force andworking full—time. Note that JL
is to the right of
€.,sothat all full—time work by these women will be
in the primary sector. For women along thisparticular borderline, the
possibility of part—time work is irrelevant, andthey are solving the
problem of maximizing
1T1+T., u(y) +c






—eh, [(1 +1)r —(T—tf)
C
where t(which is equal to tin this case) is the time within the
p
second period that the woman shifts frombeing out of the labor force to
working full—time and h is thenumberof hours in a full—time work
period. The middle term in the definition ofy reflects the fact that
the fraction Yof the training must be done again when thewoman reenters
11the laborforce, aridthe latter term reflects the fixed costs of working.
The marginal condition which emerges from this problem is given by
(1) —u(y(s hf —C)+ + t)[v(h; 8) —v(hf;8)] =0
Differentiating this condition with respectto sand 8 respectively,
yields




Ev(hz 8) -v(hf; 8)] + (hf€
-C)2u"(y)
3t — T+t )(3/38)[v(h ; 8)/38—3v(h8)]
—— =
1 + fl +
38 T1+t) [v(hr; 8) - v(h;8)] + (h€-C)2u'(y)
wheres3v/3. The sign of 3tf/3€ is strictly required only when C is
sma1i so that (sh - C)s These signs implythat along this margin,
returnsto full—time work begin earlier the greater the level of ability
(and hence wage) of the individual and begin later the greater thedesire
of the woman for children. both are results which would be expected.In
order to derive the slope of JL in the diagram, however, what we wantis
d8/d€ holding tf constant at t. Since t is a function of both s
and 8,the derivative of interest can be established by the implicit
function theorem as
,i1-/,.r
(di3/d€H = — —----—-- I) dt/dtl t +
so that the slope of JL is upward slopinq.
The curves 13 and 3Kinthe left panel and 13 and KL in the right
panel represent combinations of and8 for which women with childrenwill be on the boroerlines between workinp fuli—ticeor part—ticneend
between working nart—tiec nrflat at all , respectivelyat ;oe time t.
Le f f beotrd saco eTe 1Qeb- in tts :se is p t
considerablymore complicated than in the previous example end is left to
the appendix but there it is shown that t i.E'eispositive for
p
panel ce and neqatve for the panel (b. and3t/.3e is negative for both
1 1) cases. This implies that a woman with higher ability will reenter the
labor force earlier or later, depending on whether or not the part—time
wage depends on ability, than will a woman. with lower ability, holdinq
constant the desire for children. In either case the higher abilitywoman
will start full—time work again sooner. With reoard to the derivatives
t !.and•t,i3,itcan be shown only that at least one of them is
positive The conditions for both ofthemto be positive are derived in the
appendix). However, these are the derivatives of the dates of reentering
the labor force and ofresumingfull—time work with respect to the desires
for children, and we would expect that in the normal case both of these
derivatives would be positive. Hence, in the remainder of the analysis
(except where noted to the contrary) we will assume that the conditions are
in fact met for these derivatives to be positive and refer to such
preferences as "normal,' remembering that cases are theoretically possible
for one (but not both) of them to be negative.
Given the signs of these derivatives, the slopes of IJ JK and KL are
established iflmuchthe same manner as that of JL. Again, botht and
tfarefunctions o e and ,sothat the implicit function theorem
yields
t is 1)forPanel (a)
(de/ds) = — tt dt/d'
n ii n iJforPanel 'b)t
(d3/dmi =— - 0 tt •tidt
p 0 p
Thusfor panel (a), and in the case of normal preferences toward children,
IJ is upward slopinq and JF( is downward siopnq. Where they meet, at point
J. defines a point where the woman is indifferent at time t between
workinq full—time, part—time, or not at all. For points beyond 3,the
choice is between workinp full—time or not at all, as defined alonq the
curve JL. For panel (b) ,both13 and KL are upward sloping. Which has
the steeper slope is theoretically indeterminate, and the panel is drawn
far the situation where KL is steeper.
For the area to the left of the analysas ismuchthe same,
except that neither the full—time waqe nor the part—time wage depends on
the ability level .Forthat reason the lines EF and GH, which indicate
the boundaries between full-time work and part—time work and between part—
time work and being out of the labor force respectively, are horizontal.
The line CD, which represents the boundary between women who have children
and those who do not. is also horizontal, primarily ama result of the fact
that the level of for which the woman is indifferent between full-time
work with and without children in Figure 1 does not depend on
The exact positions of these boundaries are sensitive to, among other
things. the fixed costs of employment. In the appendix, it is shown that
3ti3Cispositive and 3tJ3C is negative. Thus, women with higher
fixed costs of employment will begin part—time work. later and full—time
work sooner than will otherwise identical women with lower fixed costs
This is to be exoected. since the nioher faxed costs have a higher
proportionala spact on the returns to part—time work than on the returns to
full—timework.The resulting effect of higher fixed costs isshownin
14Fiqure Inthisfigure, higher-fixedcosts shift the boundaries froe the
dashed lines to the solid lines. The figureindicates that the higher
fixed costs shrinks the areas of part—timeemployment in both panels. More
formally, the horizuntal direction of the shift ofa segmentsuch as13 in
thepanel (a, due to a higher value ofC,holding and t constant,
is given by
dt iac (d€/dC)L = — 0
dtf/dS
Hence,this segment shifts leftwar-d with an increasein C The formal
derivations for the shifts of the other segmentsare similar.
In combination, these boundariesserve to separate the women at time
t.1into four oroups: those with children whoare working full—time, part—
time, and not at all, and those without children whoare working full—time.
Over time during the second period, theboundaries demarcating the area of
full—time work from the areas of either part—timework or nonparticipatin
and the boundary separating the areas ofpart—time work and
nonparticipation, must be moving uniformly downward. The onlyexception
occurs at the beginning of the second period, where theboundaries
involving full—time work in the primary sector [along IJL inPanel (a) of
Figure 2 or along 13 in Panel (b) of the figure] willremain stationary for
a while. this occurs because the retraining costs fordropping out of and
then reentering the primary sector willimply a minimum length for any
periods of nonparticipation and/or part—time work at thebeginning of the
second period, with the result that thecorresponding boundaries do not
move until this minimum length of time has passed.
IV.Analysis of the Effects of Policy Changes
15This section examines the effects upon fertility arid laborforce
participation decisions of: a subsidy for the trainingof mothers with
children, an increase in the income guarantee availableto low—income
mothers with children, and an increase in the marginal taxrate on earnings
of individuals who are receiving benefit payments.In addition, reductions
in the guarantee and tax rate, or more directly a returnto the market
situation analyzed earlier where there is no transfer program, maybe taken
as an indication of the effects of a simpleworkfare program which replaces
the transfer for the full term of the life cycle. Note, however,that
because minimum wage jobs are available to all who want them,the
'workfare' is provided by low wage firms in the private sector.For each
of these policy changes, the effects are to cause someindividuals near
particular margins to change their behavior, which in Figure2 amounts to
shifting some of the boundaries separating the regionsat a particular
point in time.If the policy changes are restricted to some subset of the
general population, then the analysis of this sectionwill apply only to
the potentially eligible subpopuiation. In particular, mostof the
programs of the type under consideration apply onlyto women who are heads
of households. Although the model does consider the decisionto have
children as endogenous, marital status is not considered andhence is
effectively taken to be exogenous in determining who is eligiblefor a
program and who is not.
First consider the introduction of a training subsidy to be made
available to mothers with children. it is assumed that such a subsidyis
not available in the first period, before the fertility decision ismade,
but is available in both the second and third per1os to individualswho
elect to have children in the second period. The effects of the training
16subsidy are illustrated in Fioure 4.in this diagram, the dashed curves
representthe situationbefore the subsidy is introduced and are copied
from Figure 2.The soid lines represent tre situation after the subsidy
ardhence illustrate howbetavior reacts in response tothe subsidy.
ions 3 L in panel ta),theonlychange fromthemaximization
problem analyzed at the beginning of the last section is to include the
subsidy amount S in the equation defining y:
y =C hCT —t]—ahf [(1 +flr — (1—tf)
C +
Differentiatingthe marginal condition given in equation (1) of the last
section with respect to St then gives
at u (y)th-a — C) f ____ t_______ - =+tll; -h]+ (hfaC)2 uu(y)
The horizontal movement of 3L can be calculated as the change ina
necessary to manta.in the equilibrium relation in response to a change in
holdino & and tf constant
at ldS
(d a /dS ) i —r——---'--——->0 t ,t. dti.€f
Thus, in response to an increase in5r JL' will shift to the right.
The same kind of exercise based on the analysis of theappendix also
establishes that in panel (a) 13' will shift to the right and 3K will
shift to the left, while in panel (b) 13' and K'L' will both shift to the
right. ThLs, among individuals with ability levels above a somewhat
perverse result emerges. Individuals will tend to stay out of the labor
force longer than without a subsidy, and they will return to full—time work
17later. This result stems primarily from the fact that among this qroupthe
traininq subsidy induces only an income effect since these individuals
would havebeenretrained anyway whenthey returned tofull—time work. It
may benotedthat this result cannot beavoidedby restricting the training
subsidiesto individualswhohave been earninq nomorethan the minimum
waqe immediately prior to the traininq, since eventhese hiqher ability
individualswillhave been out of the labor force or engaged in part—time
work in the time span before they wish to be retrained for their returnto
full—time work in the primary sector.
For some individuals with an ability level just below the
subsidy may enable them to overcome the minimum wage obstacle andbe
trained for work in the primary sector when they return to full—time work
after having their children. Whether or not this happens depends upon
whether an individual would be eligible for another subsidy if she wereto
be trained by a second employer.If the subsidy were available for both
employers, then the equations in the first part of Section IIwhich
describe the total value of the individual to each employer would have to
be augmented by Since the amount the first employer is willing to
pay during the training period is related to thedifference between these
two amounts, in this case the first employer would not be willing to pay
the individual any more in the training period, and the minimum skill level
for training jr the primary sector would still be,.'If, onthe other
hand, the subsidy were available only to the first empioyerq then the
minimum skill level for training in the primary sector would have to
sat iof:
c— rtj — )]+5/T i= W t t m
Ficure 4 is drawn forthissecond case. with themniaumskii level
18for a woman with children to be trained denotedby .However,although
employers are willing to train all women with skill levels between and
,onlywomen with a sufficiently strong taste for children, that is
above P1N'inthe diagram will in 'fact obtain training. Below thatline,
the disutility of working full—time while raisingchildren implies that the
additional income available as a result of being trained isinsufficient to
compensate for the fact that the receipt of the training subsidy is
conditional on having children. The analysis thus implies thatthere is a
group of women with abilities between and above M'N and below
CD, who will find it advantageous to have children they would nothave
otherwise had in order to qualify for the subsidy.
In summary, then, the effects of a trainingsubsidy depend critically
on the individual 's ability level. For ability levels betweenEand
the effects are as intended, with the trainedwomen returning to full—
time work earlier than they otherwise would andearning substantially more
than they otherwise would have. For ability levels above theeffects
of the training subsidy may well beperverse, while for ability levels
below ,thereis no effect because the minimum wage will stillprevent
these women from obtaining training.
There are implications of this discussion for econometricstudies
designed to evaluate training programs. In the analysis oftraining
subsidies, the sharply different effects among differentgroups of women
imply that attempts to evaluate the effects of trainingprograms which do
not carefully consider the differences and discontinuitiesin the wage
offer with ability interacted with sector ofemployment, stage of the life
cycle and full—time or part—time work, will produce numbers whichare not
measuring what is intended.If such studies are to isolate trueprogram
19impacts from the effects of voluntary choices with regardto sector, hours
ofworkand careerinterruption, the training program effects will have to
be modeled in the conte>t of a structural model specified alongthe line of
the model outlined above so that those in each group can be distinguished.
FroQram effects can only be measured by comparing outcome differences
between those in the same ability—preference group, and even then,the
estimates should standardize for theeffectsof voluntary changes in labor
supply.(For related discussions, see Heckman and Robb,1985.)14
The other related policy changes to be considered are the effectsof
changesintransfer policy, and symetrically, reductions of transfers
associated with the introduction of workfare. An increase in the guarantee
of an income transfer program and a change in the benefit reductionrate of
sucha program,are more straightforward to analyze, and the resultsof the
analysisdonot appear to contain any real surprises. These two changes
are presumed to be made to a program which pays benefitsto mothers who are
not working orare workingpart—time at relatively low wages but which does
not pay benefits to women who are working full—time or are working part—
timeatrelatively highwages. In such a program,anincreaseinthe
guaranteeamount, holding the benefit reduction rate constant, will
increase the effective returns to part—time work and to nonparticipation by
the same amount but will not affect the returns to full—time work.The
effect of this increase in the guarantee amount is illustrated in Figure5.
in this gure and in the next, the dashedlinesrepresent the boundaries
beforethe changeandthe solidlines represent theboundariesafter the
change.in Panel (b) ,thekinks in the right part of the fqure occur at
the point where the part—time wage is high enough that a woman working
cart—time at that wage is no longer eligible to receivebenefitsfrom the
program. smight be expected, the net result is to pushtheboundary
2vbetiean nonparticipation andpart—timework downward, sincetheincreased
quarantee does not qeasrate any substitutioneffectsbetween
nonpartlcipation and part—tiee work4and theincome effect favors remaining
out of the lanor force lonqer. The boundaries invoivinlull—time work are
also shifted down, both because of the income effectjust mentioned and
because the fact that full—time workers are not eliqibie forbenefits means
that ar increaseinthe quarantee amount will qenerate substitution effects
away from full—time work.
The result of an increase in the benefit reduction rateare
illustrated in Figure 6.The net effect of such a change is to reduce the
effective returns to part—time work at relatively lowerwages. The returns
to full—time work or part—time work at relatively higherwages are not
affected4 since there are no benefits to be reduced, and the returns to
nonparticipation are likewise riot affected, since there is no incomeupon
which the benefit reduction rate will operate. The result is togenerate
substitution effects alonqall the boundaries involvingpart—time work at
relatively lower wages, so that individuals will beginpart—time work later
and end part—time work in favor of full—time worksooner. The analyses of
both an increase ir the benefit reduction rate and ofan increase in the
guarantee illustrate the importance of the distinction emphasized by Levy
(1981) and others between those whose earnings are beyond thebreakeven and
those whose earnings are low enough to leave themeligible for the
program.
V.Extensions of the Model.
The model that has been analyzed in the previous sectionsappears to
be amenable to several refinements which would increase itscomplexity
without changing its basic nature. First, note that the firstperiod couldbe eliminated without major changes in the analysis. This would occur if
thewoman made the choicebetweenhaving and not having children at the
beginning of her potential work career. Technically, this would do two
things to the model. One is to eliminate the1 +Y termfrom the budget
constraint, since under these circumstances any work in the primary sector
would not be broken upand as aresult retrairlir!q costs would be
irrelevant. The second would be ta eliminate the short period discussed at
the end of the last paragraph during which the boundaries would not move,
since this period ofnonmovement wasmotivated by the retraining costs.
Overall,though, omitting the first period wouldnot change the general
natureofthemodel discussed in this section nor of the results to be
discussed in following sections.
4 second refinement would be to allowfor productivity to be a
function of tenure, at least in the primary sector. Such an allowance
would have the effect of changing the exact expression of the marginal
conditions defining the boundaries between the various areas but should not
change thecharacter of the previous analysisverymuch. One change that
would be expected isthatin such a setting the penalty for dropping out of
the primary sector and then reentering would clearly be muchlargerthan
simply incurring the retraining costs already explicitly included in the
model. Asaresult, the minimum length ofa periodofnonparticipation
and/or part—time workat thebeginning of the second period should be
considerablylonger than without atenureeffect, and the length of time
during which 1JL in panel (a or IJ in panel cf Fiqure 2 would remain
stationary would becorrespondingly longer.
Athirdrefinement would be to allowformore than one birth in the
first part of the second period. For afixedsequence of births,itseemsfairly clear tha.t the analysis before the first birth and after the last
birth would be largely unchanged, and that during thechildbearing period a
model may well predict alternating labor force states. Forinstance, a
woman might drop out of the labor force for a year immediatelysucceeding
the birth of each child and then work part—time until the birth ofthe next
child.Considerably more complex would be attempts to model additional
behavior within the actual childbearing period,including possibly attempts
to model the joint decisions regarding how many children tohave, the
spacing between children, and the total length of the childbearing period.
Another refinement would consider the value of home timeduring
periods when children are not at home. For a woman who chooses not to have
children, for whom the value of home time is likely to be changing
relatively smoothly over time, a traditional life—cycle analysis of labor
force decisions should be applicable. For a woman who does choose tohave
children, it is clear that the utility function used in the above analysis
could be extended to cover the first and third periods,probably without
severely affecting the analysis. In particular, this refinement would only
affect those women with children who are still at home orworking part—time
at the end of the second period. sinceany woman working full—time toward
the end of the second period will presumably find itadvantageous to work
full—time during the first and third periods, when the value of home time
is presumably less. A complete decision would then entailcalculating the
optimal labor force behavior conditional both on having and not having
children, and making the choice regarding children so as to pick whichever
of the two paths yields a higher overall utility.
Finally, the model could introduce education as an alternative means
to acquire the necessary general training for primary sector workSA
relatively simple but informative case would allow both the intensity and
23duration of required general training to be inversely related to the amount
of education an individual has acquired. The monetary cost of the
education would be reflected in the budget constraint, and the time costs
would be reflected in a reduced amount of time available in the first
period. Such a modification would not affect the signs of the slopes
calculated for the various segments in Figures 2 and 3orthe directions of
movement in Figures 4 through 6.However, the modification does have
implications for the effectiveness ofatraining subsidy.In the original
modei there is a discrete utility difference between individuals just
below and just above the critical ablility level required for primary
sector employment, resulting in the implication that a marginal training
subsidy may result in non—marginal utility improvements for some
individuals. With endogenous education, the lower ability individuals can
use education to get around minimum wage constraints which are restraining
on—the—job general training in the primary sector. This process will be
carried to the point where the individual with marginal ability is just
indifferent between getting the education and working in the primary sector
and remaining in the secondary sector.In this setting, marginal training
subsidies will result only in marginal utility improvements for the
individuals it induces into primary sector employment.
VI. Empirical Analysis
In this section we will begin the job of exploring the empirical
implications of the odi. ecause the model speaks to labor force
patterns traininq wage offers, the role ofabilityand tastes for
children and the interrelations among these variables, there are a large
number of empirical implications which are testable, and a number of
parameters which may be estimated by using increasingly complex econometric
ntechniques. Ourhope is to provide sufficient information tc determine
whether the outcomes highlightedbythis approach are important, whether
thegeneral structure of the model seems reasonable and to provide
guidance for specification to be used in estimating a full structural
version of the model.
The empirical evidencecomesfrom the National Longitudinal Survey of
Young Waen, which has surveyed for fifteen years women who were 14 to24
yearsold in 1968, the initial year of thesurvey. bout two—thirds of the
individualsremainedin the survey in 1983, the lastyear for which the
data have been made available. Thus for individuals who remained withthe
survey for the full fifteen years, the survey covers the age spans from 14—
29 to 24-39. Particularly for women who were in their late teens whenthe
survey began, this fifteen year span covers just. the age range which is of
particular interest in terms of evaluatinq this model.In evaluating the
statistics presented in this section, however, a word of caution is in
order.One might expect the generallevels of participation to be even
highertoday than in the period covered by thesurvey. Ultimately the
model should be able to account for these changes, but significantaspects
of behavior remain exogenous to our analysis. Accordinglysimple
extrapnlation of the relations fitted here to future periodsmay be
inappropriate.
In the results which follow, the sample is restricted in severalways.
First, individuals are eliminated if they lack information on critical
variables. This most frequently arises in the cases of the ability (JQ)
variable and the taste variable. Regarding the ability variable, the NLS
lacks information on this variable for about 35 percent of thesample. As
for the taste variable, since this variable is constructed on the basis of
25questions asked in the 1972 survey, it is missing for individuals who did
not remainwiththe survey until at least this time.1 The sample further
omits individuals who had not reached the age of 30bythe time of the last
survey which the particular individual completed. This is done to
eliminate cases in which the observed pattern of work behavior is too short
to impart meaningui information.
For each individual, the labor force behavior is examined in every
survey year following the survey year in which the individuallast reported
full—time enrollment in school.In each of these surveys, the individual
is classified as working full—time U ,workingpart—time (pt) ,ornot in
the labor force (nlfl. The resulting sequences of labor force behavior
were then separated into four groups: (ii full—time work in all applicable
survey years, (ii) either full—time work or part—time work in all
applicable years, with at least some part—time work, (iii) sequences which
ir,clude at least some part—time work and some years not in the labor force,
and iv) either full—time work or a not in the labor force status in all
applicable years, with at least some years not in the labor force. These
four groups are denoted in the tables by ft, ft/pt, ft/pt/nlf, and
ft/nlf, respectively.
Table 2 presents regressions of each of these four groups on a set of
10 and taste variables, with standardization for birth year and race.In
each regression, the dependent variable is a dummy variable ta:ing on a
value of unity if the individual had a labor force participation pattern of
the indicated type. The 10 andtastevariables are each separated into
three categories so that roughly equal numbers of those with a high school
education or less -fall into each category. For the 10 variable, the low
category is 1 and the high category is 3, whereas for the taste variable a
value of 1 indicates astrongtaste for children andhometime and a value
26of 3 indicates a weak taste.It should be kept in mind that ID is
admittedly an imperfect measure of theunderlying theoretical construct of
ability—related earnings power.
lable 3 is derived from the estimates of Table2 and attempts to
present the information in a more useful form. Foreach of the reqres5jon
in Table 2, the coefficients of each of the ID—tastecombinations is
adjusted up or down so that the weightedsum of the coefficients is zero.
Then the resulting coefficients arearranged in a grid corresponding to the
various ID—taste combinations, andcorresponding also in a rough manner to
the axes of Figure 2 of Section Ill. Theactual entries in Table 3
indicate the amounts by which theaverage fraction of individuals in a
particular sequence must be adjustedup or down for the particular cell.
For example, the first entry indicated that forthe low ID and high taste
for children and home life combination, therewould be 11.6 percent fewer
individuals with continuous full—timeparticipation than there would be for
the complete sample (again, correcting for birthyear and race).
In comparing the entries of Table 3 with thetwo panels of Figure 2,
it is evident that they correspond much betterto panel (b) of the figure
than to panel (a).To see this, consider the figure to bepictured for the
time immediately after the second period begins.In this case, any
individuals below the lines EFIJL in panel (a) andEFIJ in panel (b) should
always be observed in the full—time status. Sequences
involving only -full—
time and part—time work should originate fromareas of the figure in which
the individual elects part—time work at thebeginning of the second period.
Sequences involving some part—time work and some time notin the labor
force should arise if the individual is in thearea above GHKJ in panel (a)
or above GHKL in panel (b). Finally,sequences involving some time not in
27the labor force but no part—time work can arise from anindividual
initially above JL in panel (a).These sequences can also arise in panel
(b) if the fixed costs of employment are sufficiently high sothat the
left—hand portions of EF and 6H and of IJ and KL becamecoincident. In
this regard, it may be more appropriate in an empiricalmodel to regard the
fixed costs of employment as a stochastic variable which variesfrom
individual to individual. In a situation such as panel (b), lower ability
individuals with high fixed costs who begin the second periodnot working
would proceed directly to full—time work, while individualswith similar
ability but lower fixed costs would go through a period of part—timework.
For higher ability individuals, high fixed costs are less likelyto induce
a transition directly from not working tofull—time work. The empirical
implication is that in this panel, lower ability workers as a groupshould
be less likely to have work patterns with at least some part—timework.
in looking at Table 3 it is evident that continuous full—timework is
depressed in the upper left part of the table andenhanced in the lower
right part of the table. This is exactly what onewould expect from either
panel of the figure, however4 and although it isconsistent with the model
it does little to distinguish which panel in the figure iscloser to the
truth.The situation is much different when the last kind of sequence is
examined4 however. This is the sequence which contains some yearsnot in
the labor force but no part—time work.In the table, it is seen that this
hind of behavior is considerably more common among individualswith lower
IG scores., contrary to what would be expected ifpanel(a) of the figure
were correct. Given relatively high fixed costs of employment,however,
this behavior is consistent with panel (b) of the figure.In this case,
what is happening is that the high fixed costs of employment make part—time
workunattractive1-orthose with very lowpart—time wages but less
-7Funattractive for those with higher abilityand correspondingly higher part—
time wages.
The results forthetwo kindsof sequences involvingsomepart—time
workare lessconsi stent than the other results, but they too are broadly
consistent with the model. There is no clear relationship between the
part—time sequences and the IQvariable,but particularly in the lasttwo
columnsof Table3 the fraction cfpart—timesequences alsoinvolvingsome
yearsnotin the laborforce increases as tasteforhome and family time
increases and the fraction ofpart—time sequences inwhichthe individual
isalways in the labor force declines. Again, this corresponds well to
what might be expected on the basis of the theoretical model, since
sequences involving some time not working should begin in the upper part of
the diagram where tastes for home and family time are high.
There isanotherpiece ofevidencewhich also suggests that Panel (b)
of Figure 2 may be the closer to the true model. For any woman who
experienced both full—time and part—time work, and for whom valid wages
could be calculated for both, the full—time wages are averaged into a
single number, and the same is done for all part—time wage observations.
Siven a single full—time average wage and a single part—time average wage
for each woman, the correlation between the two was calculated for the
women in the sample. The simple correlation is 0.41 over 1586 individuals,
and the implied regression coefficient of part—time on full—time wages is
0.70.Theseimply a fairly strong positive relationship between the full—
time and part—time wages, which is somewhat more consistent with Panel (b)
than Panel (a) in the figure.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has presented a model which incorporates a number of
Lfeatures from the low waqe labor market for women. The model has been used
to analyze alternative patterns of labor market participation and home time
over the life cycle. The critical labor market choices are whether or not
to interrupt the career, whether or not to work part—time, and when to
return to full—time work, with all these choices conditioned on the
individuals own ability, on the penalties for career interruption and for
part—time work, and on the woman s preference for home time and children.
Reasons for differences in wage offers associated with each regime were
analyzed in the context of a two sector model of the labor market.In one
sector there was traininq, which was a mix of specific and general, while
the other offered jobs with wages at or just above the minimum wage.
Ability differences were assumed to be associated with wage offer
differences for full—time work in the primary sector, but not for full—time
work in the secondary sector.
Among the policy measures which can be analyzed in the context of this
model, the most interesting results are obtained for a training subsidy for
mothers with children. Such a subsidy does permit some women with marginal
ability levels to qualify for training programs whereas they would not be
able to obtain training without the subsidies. For higher ability women,
however, the result is perverse in the sense that it delays both the return
to the labor force and the resumption of full—time work after the
childbearing period. On the other hand, changes in the guarantee and/or
marginal tsx rates on benefits for low income mothers have the effects
which might be more or less expected from casual observation. An increase
in the guarantee will tend to reduce full—time work and increase both part—
time work and nonparticipation, at least on the assumption that full—time
workers earn sufficient income to be ineligible for the benefit. On thesame assumption.areduction in the marginal taxratewill tend to increase
part—time work at the expense of both full—time work andnonparticipation.
Perhaps the strongest implications of the analysispertain to
evaluations of training programs. These evaluations frequentlyattempt to
isolate program impacts by comparingoutcomesforprogramcompleters with
those who are thought to be comparable due to theirdemographic
characteristics and earnings histories. There area couple of particularly
treacherous problems for evaluation studies suggestedby the model.First,
it is important not to confuse changes inwage rates which are brought
about by training programs with changes whichare due to changes in labor
supply. This is particularly likely to be a problem for ar individualwho
is working part—time before entering into theprogram. Secondly, the
analysis shows that a training program affects two quite differentgroups.
There is a fairly small group whose members would notobtain training at
all without the program, and for these individuals theeffect of training
is a good measure of the effect of theprogram. However, there is a larger
group for whom the program affects only the timing of training and work
decisions, and for this group the relation between havingparticipated in a
training program and the subsequent wage is likely to overstate
substantially the effect of the program.
The empirical analysis is more suggestive thanconclusive, but it does
appear to indicate that the general implications of the model are broadly
consistent with data drawn from the National LongitudinalSurvey of Young
Women.It indicates fairly strongly that a more completeempirical
ifiodel of the sequences of work and home decisions ofyoung women should
embed a part—time wage that is correlated with full—timewages, and that
such a model should probably also consider fixedemployment costs which are
possibly different from one woman to the next.In view of these results,
31it would appr appropriate to pursue further this analysis with the
eventual aim of developing a structural empirical model suitable for policy
analysisFootnote a
I.In addition to the choices about labor supply and whether or not
to have children, choices analyzed n the model, a young woman makes
related choices about schooling, marriage, and concerning number, spacing
and quality of children, perhaps making preliminary plans simultaneously
for each, some more tentatively than others, and then modifying these plans
in light of realizations of stochastic variables. Considerable work has
been done on these issues.(For two examples of many, see Weiss and
Sronau, 198l and Heckman, Hotz and Walker, 1985.)In order to focus on
the basic labor market decisions and their interactions with the decision
as to whether or not to have children, the model abstracts from the
marriage and schooling decisions, treats fertility as certain ignores
questions about number and spacing of children, and adopts certain
assumptions that will have the effect of fixing the woman's age at first
birth. Thus while the model brings together many important determinants of
behavior, there is a long way to go.
Some of the problems created by conditioning parts of the empirical
analysis on what are endoqenous outcomes are discussed by Heckman and
Willis (1977). Although the model conditions on formal schooling, note
that its structure is compatible with the model developed by Lehrer and
Nerlove (1981), where the endogeneity of the schooling decision is
emphasized,it would be straight forward to extend our model to include
the decision, but would, of course, add to the complexity of the solution.
2. wmay be above the minimum wage if women are more productive than
some other group (eq. teenagers) in the secondary sector.In this case,
unemployment would be concentrated among the other qroup whose members
would be paid just the minimum wage. The growing importance of women in
minimum wage jobs is documented by Gramlich (1976).3. This expression supposes that the discounted value of productivity
remains constant over tiee which in turn implies that real productivity 1.5
growingat the same rate as the real interest rate. This assumption is
made for expositional convenience.
4. In this expression the employer is willing to finance all of the
specific training costs but none of the costs of general training.The
exact percentage of specific trainirg costs that the employer is willing to
finance would be different if the growth rate of productivity were not
equalto the real interest rate but thegeneral nature of the analysis
wouldnot be changed.
5.A second possible constraint might arise iftheperiod Tm were short
enough relative to the training period that the employer would not be able
to recover his share of the trainingcosts in the post—training period
whilestill paying a wage at least as great as the wage in tfle secondary
sector.This constraintwould seem tobe more of a potential problemin
thefirst period than after the woman returns to full—time work in the
second and third periods. The major results discussed below do not appear
to be substantiallydifferent ifthis second constraintis binding inthe
firstperiods and sothe discussion will proceed on the presumption that it
isthe constraint discussed in the text is the binding one.For a further
discussion of this type of implicit contract inasomewhat different
context, see Guetman and Steinscier (1985). Further complications, which
are not considered, would address the possibility that the rate cf
deteriorationcf akIlls is reduced by part—time work coTiparad to no market
work,and that the mix between specific and general skills varies among
iobsand thus issubjecttochoice whenthe initial occupation is chosen.
(Forrelated discussions,see Fclachek 1979.i
346.Thereare two reasons for specifyinq the consumption argument in the
utility function in terms of lifetime income. First preferences are
specified in terms of lifetime income rather than in terms of income spent
in each period separately because the model is not particularly concerned
with the pattern of consumption over time.(Problems created by borrowing
constraints and the implications of these problems for this analysis are
discused in footnote 13 below.) Second, an assumption that the minimum
wage is fixed in terms of primary sector output allows us to specify this
argument as a function of income rather than of consumption of each of the
two goods produced by the economy. The reason is that the least capable
group of secondary sector workers must be paid the minimum wage, and fixing
its value in terms of primary sector output has the effect of dictatina the
price ratio between the outputs of the two sectors. Then the composite
commodity theorem implies that preferences may be expressed in terms of
income rather than in terms of the consumption amounts of the two goods
separately.
7. This elasticity is —u"y/u'. If the elasticity exceeds unity
everywhere, then utility has an absolute upper bound. To see this! suppose
=k>1.This differential equation has the solution u =a+by'
k
withb < 0 required because marginal utility must be positive. With
k > 1and b < 0, u has an absolute maximum of a as y tends toward
03. Afurther characteristic of interest is that if the elasticity of
marginal utility is between zero and unity for u(y), the same must be
true for s(y) =u(y+m),where m is any positive amount. This is
because
—sMy/sCyIy+m)Jt—u"(y+m)(y+m)/u(y+m)]
and since both factors on the right hand side are between zero and unity in
absolute value, the left hand side must be also. This means that someamount m, say representing the husbands income, can be added to y
without invaiidatinq the assumption that 0—u'y/u'< 1.
8.In section II, on the job training costs were assumed to involve a
fraction of the real wage.In this circumstance, as long as the rate of
real wage growth and the real interest rate are similar, OJT itself creates
no incentive to work earlier in the second period. Otherwise, if the woman
were to leave the labor force for the same amount of time later in the
period she would not earn any more income, but would lose more utility
than she would were she to leave the labor force for an equal length of
time at the beginning of the period. Similarly, if the woman works part—
time at any time during the second period, it should be after she has taken
her time (if any) out of the labor force, but before any full—time work
during the period.
9. The derivation of the sign of the numerator of tia€alsouses the
assumption that the elasticity of the marginal utility of income does not
exceedunity.
10.As is shown jr the appendix, the condition .3t/.3s0 in panel (b)
is strictly required only if the fixed costs of employment are small.
0therwise the sign of this derivative is indeterminate.
11.Another general solution exists for the model, as illustrated in
Appendix Figure Al. This solution, however, corresponds to a situation in
which no low—wage women (i.e. those who can only work in the secondary
sector) with children are working full—time at the beginning ofthesecond
period.Forfurtherdiscussion ofthis solution. see the last part of the
ap p a ndi
12.This would rot be true if the discounted value of the subsidy to the
second employer were less than the discounted value to the first employer.
•bIn that cse, the minimum level of ability necessary for traininq in the
prisar/ sectorwould be reduced thcuqh not by as much as it woul d beif
the subsidy were completely unavailable to the second employer.
l..In specifing the consumption term in the utility function in terms
of lifetime income, the model has assumed that the individual is not
subject to a borrowing coristrai nt.Such a constraint is most likely to be
bindingwhen an individualwith ability between s and is offered a
traIningsubsidy, since this individual is restricted to the lower part—
time wage until after she returns to full—time work in the second period.
with the higher wages available only then. (In all other cases, individuals
who could expect higher earrings after the childbearing period would find
them available in the first period as well.) However, there are acouple
of considerations which might mitigate the effects of any borrowing
constraints. First, there is the characteristic of children thatyounger
children tend to be expensive in terms of time while older children tend to
be expensive in terms of resources. This means that by the time the
financial demands of children are reaching their peaks, the womanmay well
have already returned to full—time work. nd secondly, the period of
children is not the only stage of the life cycle in which expendituresmay
exceed income there is also the phase of retirement, which may be regarded
as occurring after the third period in the model. Hence some of the
increased earning power after the individual returns to full—time workmay
simply enable individuals to service their expected retirement needs.
Despite these considerations, it may nevertheless be the case that
individuals in the second period are constrained by borrowing constraints.
If so, the utility function must be written in terms of income available in
each period rather than in terms simply of total income.In this
circumstance, one might expect the major points of the paper, including theanomalous effects of training subsidies and the cautions regarding
evaluation studies of training subsidies to persist even in a borrowing
constrained model if the utility function entails a reasonable degree of
substitutability of income in different periods. The analysis would become
more complicated, thouqhq and consideration would have to be given to the
possibility that there may be particular sets of circumstances in which
these findings might no longer hold.
14.Our analysis assumes that training programs are permanent arid well
understood. Evaluation studies based either on econometric techniques or
on a classic experimental desiqn, must also deal with the difficulties
created by temporary programs. The introduction of new programs and
subsequent reoptimization, and the inability to count on current programs
being around in future years will lead to behavior different from what
would be observed with a permanent program available over the long term.
If a training program is perpetually availabie there is an optimal time
for the individual to enroll that may not be available when the program is
temporary.
15.The taste variable is formed on the basis of twelve attitudinal
questions which were asked in the 1972 survey. (Specifically, these
variables are reference numbers 3867—3878 in the survey.) For each
question, the five possible responses are arranged so that the lowest
response corresponds to an attitude of wanting to be home during periods
when children are present and the hiohest response reflects an attitude
that work is all right snd even desirable during periods when young
children are present in the household. The responses so ordered are
assigned values of i to 5 for each question and are summedacrossthe
twelve questions. The resulting sums are broken into three categorical
38var iab I es.
39Table 1
ValueofProductivity For Full—Time Work
Value of
Sector Circumstances Productivity
Primary Training completed on current
job
Primary In traininq on current job, with EU—ri
no previous traininq
Primary In traininq on current job, with (1—Yr)
previous training on a
different primary sector job






Va r 1ab 1 e
constant —0.60i 0.111 1.226 0.265
k.1a9 (0. 105; 0. 193) to. 193)
birtrtyear 0.012 —0.001 —0.014 0.003
0.003) 0. 002 (0. 004 (0. 004
race 0. 125 —0.009 —0. 147 0.031
cO.026) (0.016'; (0.029) (0.029)
101—ri —o.i:25 —0.003 —o.o3t: 0.058
(0. 046) (0. 02B) (0. 052) (0.052)
102 —12 —0. 066 0.014 0.052 0.000
(0 .045) (0. 028) 0. 051 ) (0. 051)
103 —T3 0.052 0.003 —0.011 —0.044
(0.433) (0.027) (0.050) (0.050
102—TI 0.029 —0.002 0.034 —0.061
(0. 042) (0. 026) (0. 048) (0. 048)
102 —13 0. 112 0.087 —0. 062 —0. 136
(0.040) (0.025) (0.046) (0.046)
103 —TI 0.073 0.026 0.034 —0. 133
0.040) (0. 025) (0.045) (0.045)
103 —12 0.129 0.072 —0.078 —0.123
(0. 039.' cO. 024) (0. 045) (0. 045)
103 —T3 0.235 0.087 —0.127 —0.196
(0. 036) (0. 022) (0.041) (0.041)
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45Appendix
In the first part of this appendix we will derive the impact of
changes in and 8 on the dates of entering and leaving part—time work
in the second period. The utility problem in this case involves maximizing
.1 +t J -ft






j d(t) v(hf8) dt]
subject to the budget constraint
v =sh. IT —t] +w() h(t. —t )— h. [(1 +/) i-T1— iT—t) C
t F p p t p t t p
for primary sector workers. Secondary sector workers solve the
problem with wand w5(both independent of ) replacing
w () in the budget constraint.




























ion, the conditions for utility moximizationcan be found
thedefinition of yintothe utility function,
with respect to t andt,and setting the results
p +
Theseconditions are:
40— u'(w h —C)+ Cv—v ) pp p a p
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Tofind how t and t are affected by chanqes
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totallydifferentiate the above equations to obtain the
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By Cramer's rule, M /.3s =IAI/IAI, where A is the matrix
P Ps
h —C)s+u'w'h uu(sh —w h )(w h —C) pp pp f pp pp
u"(sh —w h )s+u'th —w'h } u"(sh —w h )2+4(v —vJ F pp f pp f pp tpt .1
and A is the matrix on the left hand side of the matrixequation above.
Evaluating the determinant of A yields
IAI =Eu"(wh —C)s+uw'h ]'(v —v ) PE pp pp fpf
+u'u"(€h—w h )Eh h (w's—w )+C(h —w'h )] F pp pf p p f pp
In one extreme case, this determinant is positive if w' =0,sinceu11 c
0, th < 0VP > v (if nonparticipation is a viable alternative to part—
time work), and w h> C(if part—time work is a viable alternative to PP
47nonparticipation).In the other extreme case, the determinant is negative
if w = since —uy/u 1by assumption, and (whC)s < hy. The
latter inequality follows from (hf—h)/hf > (1+Y)rTt/(T_t+),which will be
satisfied as long as part—time hours are nontrivially shorter thanfull—
time hoursandthe training period is relatively short as compared to the
lifetime amount of full—time work.
Similarly, the determinant of A can be evaluated as
Al = (v —v ) (v —v ) +u1[(wh —C) (V—v) +(h—w h )'(v—v )]
pf pf np pp 4 p + + pp p n p
Together, these two determinants imply that at/must be positive in
the case of w =0and neqative in the case of w =
p
- p
For t ,3t/E€ =IA1/IAI, where A is the matrix
f f 4€
u(w h -C)4+ (v -v ) uu(w h -C)s+u'w'h
pp pn p pp pp
Iu'€h—w hi (w h —C) u"(€h —w h )s+u(h —w'h >
L 4pp pp f pp 4 pp
with the determinant given by
=u"u(wh —C)[h h (w —w'€)—C(h —w h 1]
pp p4 p p 4 pp
+(v—v )[u"(sh—wh )s+u(h.—wh )]
p rp fpp +pp
IfC is sufficiently small, this determinant is negative for bothof the
extreme cases, w =0and w =€.Forw =0,the last term is less
p p p
than zero because c 0 and
p
u'(€h4—wh)s + u'h. > uhfY + uh = uh4[(u'y/u) + 1]> 0 p f I
with the last inequality arising because -u'y/u 1 Similar reasoning
applies if w =€.Thus, in bothextreme cases .3t4/3s is negative 'for
4BsuHicientjy small C,andotherwise itis ofindeterminate sign.
For the extremecamew ) both A and IA are p pE
neqativ(with C and it will be ofinterestto ask which is larger in
maqnitue. Under these circumstances the two determinants willreduce to
IA =(u"y+u)h (v—v •pf pf
IA I= .uHv+u)h_h}(v —v
tpp np
Forsmall differences in income the first terms will beapproximately
equal, and the first derivative will be larger in absolute magnitude if the
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The first term on each side of this expression is the rate atwhich the
weight on v in the utility function is declining throughout the second
period, and one would expect this decline to be larger earlier in the
period, so that ll would be larger than
I4I.However,the fractions
in the second term on each side represent the marginal utilityper hour of
hours worked full—time and hours worked part—time, and underthe assumption
of diminishing marginal utility one would expect themarginal utility of
full—time hours to be greater. Hence, whether the above relationholds or
does not hold depends upon the specific parameters in theutility function.
Evaluation of the derivatives with respect to eproceedsin much the




— (v—v) u"(h —w h ) (w h —C)
'
pn p f pppp
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Takinqthe determinant and substitutin in -fromthetwo marqinai conditions
yields
IA I =- (v-v) u"(h.-wh ) (v -v )/u]+v -v
pl pn p tpp+p + +p f
+ (v_V)uu(€h_W h )dv -v
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Similarly =II/iAI,where A is given by
u(w h -C)+(v -v )-v-v
pp p np p np
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Substitutino from the two marQinal conditions qives a determinant of
IA.1 =-[u'(wh -C) (v -v)/u)+v-v )} (v-v)
pp pnp p n p +p+
+ th (v—v)u(w h —C)d (V —v)/u
pn p pp+ p 1-
Thisyields the condition thatat/.3willbe positive if
V V V—V
[1 + —-
V —v L 'w h —C) V —V
pf p pp np
Notethat either this condition or the previous one must be ful+illed so
thatat iestone drd ossi1 bcth : the two deritives t iH nd
p
mustbe positive.
50T analyze the effects of hiqher fixed costs ofemployment, it is
necessary first to calculate how these costs affect tand trhcidinQ
other ti,jnqs constant. Usinq the same methodolooyas above, the relevant
derivatives may be calculated as dt /LC =iI/) and •3t/C =
p pC
wherethe denominators are the same matrices as before. For
the numerator of •3t18C, wehave the matrix
p
I-u'-u'(wh -C) (T-T ) u1(sh-w h(w h -C) pp p f pp pp
uhw h )(T-t ) u'(€h -w h )2+(v -v L + pp p + T +
whose determinant is given by
IA =-u'u"(sh-w h -(v-v )tu+u'(w h -C)(T-t )] > 0 pC p pp Fp F pp p
with the inequality following because u+u'(wh—C) (T—t> u'+uy 0.
For the numerator of
3t.f/8C,the matrix is
UU(W h -C)4+(v -v ) _uuu(wh-C) (T-t ) pp p lip pp p
u" (sh —w h) (w h —C) —u' (zh —w h ) (T—t )
j Fpp pp + pp p
whose determinant is given by
IAI =uu"(h—w h }(w h —C) —h(v—v )u"(Eh —w h )T—t ) <:a fC p pp pp p n p + pp p
Hence, atiacispositive and t/dC is negative.
As a final topic in the appendix, we consider the situation whereno
low—wage women with children elect to work full—time in the earlypart of
the second period. This is the case illustrated inFigure Al, and it
corresponds to an instance in which the slope of the segments in Figure 1
between full—time and part—time work are relativelysteeper, so that at
51sufficiently low waqe levels women would not find it advantaqeousto work
full-time if they have children. Ps time passes in thesecond period, the
areas corresponding to nonparticipation and to part--timework will move
upward in the diaqram, for exactly the same reasons asdiscussed in the
text and earlier in this appendix. However, the boundary separatingwomen
with children and women without children must remain fixedthrouqhout the
period, so that although later on in the periodthe boundaries between
full—time wurk part—time works and nonparticipation willlook much like
Figure 2. the boundary between women with andwithout children will not be
the horizontal segment pictured in Figure 2 but willcontinue to be the
segment pictured in Figure 1. Note that in this casethere is a positive
association between the ardthe minimum level of 9 for which the
woman will choose to have children.
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